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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 1, 1993,' several amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure2 went into effect,3 including sweeping amendments to
federal discovery practice.4 This was the culmination of an extended pro-

* Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.
1. Editor'sNote: THE AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS
were originally published in a House Document at H.R. Doc. No. 74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 98
(1993). The House Document appears in its entirety at AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401. The Florida Law Review has elected to cite to FederalRules Decisions
for the sake of efficiency. The reprintedin form is used throughout the symposium issue to refer to
the original publication of the material in House Document form, however, the citation to H.R. Doc.
No. 74 will appear only in the initial citation to the amendments in each article. Thereafter, the citation will be to AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401. As a final
note, portions of the material are also in the Interim Edition of the 114th volume of Supreme Court
Reporter.
2. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS, H.R. DOC. No.
74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1993), reprinted in AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401, 401 (1993) [hereinafter AMENDMENTS].
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988). By law, proposed rules become effective on December 1 of the
year in which they are transmitted to Congress, unless Congress decides otherwise. Id.
4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's notes. The new Rule 26 provides in relevant
part:
(a) REQUIRED DISCLOSURES; METHODS TO DISCOVER ADDITIONAL MATrER.
(1) Initial Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by
order or local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to
other parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each
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cess in which the organized bar vigorously opposed the amendments.'

individual likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts
alleged with particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the
information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or
control of the party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing
party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the
documents or other evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from
disclosure, on which such computation is based, including materials bearing
on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be
liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action
or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, these disclosures shall be made
at or within 10 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). A party
shall make its initial disclosure based on the information then reasonably available
to it and is not excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully completed its investigation of the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of another
party's disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures.
(d) TIMING AND SEQUENCE OF DISCOVERY. Except when authorized under these rules or
by local rule, order, or agreement of the parties, a party may not seek discovery from any
source before the parties have met and conferred as required by subdivision (f)....
(f) MEETING OF PARTIES; PLANNING FOR DISCOVERY. Except in actions exempted by
local rule or when otherwise ordered, the parties shall, as soon as practicable and in any
event at least 14 days before a scheduling conference is held or a scheduling order is due
under Rule 16(b), meet to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the
possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case, to make or arrange for the
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(l), and to develop a proposed discovery plan. The
plan shall indicate the parties' views and proposals concerning:
(1) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures under subdivision (a) or local rule, including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) were made or will be made;
(2) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be
completed, and whether discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited to or
focused upon particular issues;
(3) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under
these rules or by local rule, and what other limitations should be imposed; and
(4) any other orders that should be entered by the court under subdivision (c) or
under Rule 16(b) and (c).
The attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties that have appeared in the case are
jointly responsible for arranging and being present or represented at the meeting, for attempting in good faith to agree on the proposed discovery plan, and for submitting to the
court within 10 days after the meeting a written report outlining the plan.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), (d), (f).
5. Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1992); see also ABA Denounces New Discovery Rule, Accredits Lawyer Specialization
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Much of the bar's unprecedented efforts to block the amendments revolved around the introduction of "automatic disclosure" to federal practice.' This new concept requires counsel for the parties to have an early
meeting at which they must disclose certain information to their opponents
without waiting for a discovery request.' Subsequent discovery is then

limited.'
The amendments were intended to operate in conjunction with the
Civil Justice Reform Act's (CJRA)9 attempt to achieve a meaningful reduction in expense and delay.'" As a member of the Judicial Conference
Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure, I voted in favor of the
disclosure provisions, because I had conducted an experiment which
showed that the amendments were effective. On the basis of my experiment, I became convinced that the objections raised by the opponents of
the disclosure amendment-it was too vague and it eviscerated the attorney/client relationship-were unduly alarmist." In fact, the local bar
liked the disclosure scenario implemented in my experiment, and the Eastern District of Kentucky CJRA Committee voted to adopt it, 2 even if
Congress 3had rejected it as a federal rule before the December 1, 1993
deadline.'
In an unprecedented move, instead of accepting the disclosure amendments when they became effective, the organized bar went up into the
hills and began to wage guerilla warfare. First, it made efforts to get Congress to repeal the amendments.' 4 Also, the bar lobbied at the local level
in the individual federal districts to get them to opt out.'

Agencies, 62 U.S.L.W. 2095, 2095 (Aug. 17, 1993) (noting that a "vocal majority" of the American
Bar Association's policymaking body urged congress not to accept the proposed amendment to Rule
26).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a); see also Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1348 (1978) (setting forth standards for imposing a duty to disclose). See generally Bell et al., supra note 5 (defining and critiquing
the automatic disclosure provisions in the proposed amendments).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0.
8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b), (d).
9. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V 1993).
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee's notes.
11. See Bell et al., supra note 5, at 39-46; Justice William H. Erickson, Limited Discovery and
the Use of Alternative Proceduresfor Dispute Resolution, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 303, 306-07, 309
(1994); Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators,NAT'L LJ., Aug.
17, 1992, at 15.
12. Districts Develop Myriad of Responses to FederalRules Changes, INSIDE LTIo., Feb.-Mar.
1994, at 8, available in WESTLAW, JLR Database.
13. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14. See Steven A. Brick & John M. True, What Practitionersin the Northern District of California Should Know About the Recent Changes in the Federal Rules, C902 ALI-ABA 455, 469
(1994), available in WESTLAW, ALI-ABA Database.
15. Some districts have already opted out of the automatic disclosure provision, while others have
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A brief history of the amendments, my experiences at the hearings
before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, and my experiment follow.
II. MECHANICS OF RULES CHANGES
The Judicial Conference of the United States (Judicial Conference)
responds to various committees' recommendations, including those pertaining to rules.' 6 The first of these committees is the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee). 7 The Standing
Committee in turn acts on the recommendations of its various Advisory
Committees: Civil, Criminal, Appellate, Evidence, and Bankruptcy.
Aside from an act of Congress, the various sets of rules can be
changed only upon the initiative of the committees. 9 The committees are
receptive to suggestions from the bench, bar, and public. 2 After a meticulous drafting process, 21 the Advisory Committees report their proposed
revisions to the Standing Committee. The Standing Committee actually
has the final word on what changes will be proposed. 23 It may make any
revisions it deems appropriate or may remand the matter to the Advisory
Committee for further drafting or study.24
After the drafting process is complete, the revisions are published for
comment, and public hearings are held before the appropriate Advisory
Committee.2 ' Further revisions may then be made in light of the comments. 26 The Standing Committee forwards the final proposed changes to
the Judicial Conference,27 which in turn forwards them to the United
States Supreme Court 8 and, ultimately, to Congress for final approval.29

deferred implementation until they review the new rule. See Christine Hausen, Key Districts' Responses to the FederalRules Changes, INSIDE LITIG., Dec. 1993, at 9, available in WESTLAW, JLR Database.
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2) (1988). The Judicial Conference is comprised of the chief judge
of each judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of International Trade, and a district judge from
each judicial circuit. 28 U.S.C. §331 (1988).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (1988).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c) (1988); Carl Tobias, The Transmittal Letter Translated, 46 FLA. L.
REV. 127, 133 (1994) (discussing the significant public input in the amendment process).
21. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 20, at 133.
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b), (d) (1988).
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (1988).
24. Id.
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c) (1988); Tobias, supra note 20, at 133, 139.
26. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 20, at 139-40.
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (1988).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988); see also Letter from L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Judicial Conference of the United States, to the Chief Justice of the United States and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court (Nov. 27, 1992), reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 514 (transmitting pro-
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III. How THE DISCLOSURE CHANGES CAME ABOUT

I was appointed to the Standing Committee about the time the recent
amendments were introduced.3" The process began in October 1990,
when Robert E. Keeton, District Judge for the District Court of Massachusetts, was named Chair of the Standing Committee.3' Sam C. Pointer,
Chief District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, was named
Chair of the Advisory Committee.32 Paul D. Carrington, then Dean of the
Duke University School of Law, had been the reporter to the Advisory
Committee for some time.33
It is my belief that the catalyst for the changes was the passage of the
CJRA, 4 which required United States District Courts to adopt reform
plans and to experiment with alternative dispute resolution and other devices to reduce expense and delay in litigation.35 Senator Biden and the
Senate perceived,36 rightly or wrongly, the following: (1) that there are
great abuses in the legal system;37 (2) that the Civil Rules adopted in
1938 had become unwieldy; 31 (3) that the necessity to produce lots of
billable hours was leading to unreasonable and oppressive discovery requests; 39 and (4) that something needed to be done to reduce expense and
delay.' It is my understanding that Dean Carrington also had been working on a disclosure system for a long time.
In light of Senator Biden's proposals, the time appeared to be ripe for
the judiciary to make some effort at self-reform. Consequently, at the
October 1990 meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Judge
Pointer presented the Committee with a fairly complete preliminary draft
of a disclosure system for its consideration. 4'

posed rules to the Supreme Court).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988).
30. For several articles that comment on and trace the history of the changes to the Rules, see
generally Gerald G. MacDonald, Hesiod, Agesilaus and Rule 26: A Proposalfor a More Effective
MandatoryInitial Disclosure Procedure,28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 819 (1993).
31. Carl Tobias, New Rule in Need of Trial Run, NAT'L L.i., June 21, 1993, at 15.
32. Carl Tobias, ReconsideringRule 11, 46 U. MAMI L. REv. 855, 863 (1992).
33. Id.
34. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5090-96
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V 1993)).

35. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. V 1993).
36. See S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802,
6805 [hereinafter CJRA REPORT]. The House of Representatives made an analogous report. See H.R.
REP. No. 322, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-26 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1303-14.
37. See CJRA REPORT, supra note 36, at 6808-11.
38. Id. at 6810-11.

39. See id. at 6810.
40. See id. at 6809.
41. Copies of the original proposals, the subsequent modifications, and hearings are available at
the Rules Committee Support Office of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, One
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It seems that in October 1990 no one realized how controversial the
disclosure concept was going to be.42 It took several months of meticulous revision before the proposed disclosure rule went out for comments.4 3 Because so many adverse comments were received and so many
people wanted to be heard, the rule revisors scheduled several days of
hearings in different sessions in Atlanta and Los Angeles." A string of
witnesses-given five minutes apiece-testified for two or three solid
days. Hardly anyone spoke in favor of disclosure-almost all of the comments were negative.45
The primary opponents of disclosure were big product manufacturers,
such as Honda and Hughes Aircraft. 46 The logic of their complaint was
as follows: In products liability actions, they are served with vague "shotgun" complaints that are sufficient under the notice pleading approach of
the current Rules. Complaints can launch a volley of scattershot allegations in automobile product cases, for example. Mandatory disclosure
would burden such manufacturers with producing copious amounts of
material gathered from around the world, including all design documents
for a product, all advertising, filings with consumer agencies, and so forth.
In an effort to meet these objections, the draft rule was amended to
provide that disclosure would be required only for matters "relevant to
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings. '4' This requirement was designed to clarify and limit what information had to be initially
disclosed. 48 In the automobile example, the plaintiff would have to specify that an alleged "handling defect" is attributable to the "brakes" or vehicle being "top-heavy." The defendant would then know to disclose material about the brakes and not the windshield. The addition of the "with
particularity" requirement was a pragmatic effort to meet the objection that
the standard for disclosure was too vague-not a philosophical decision to
return to the "fact pleading" concept that preceded the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 49 The limit on interrogatories and depositions was considered a trade-off for the early disclosure requirement."

Columbus Circle N.E., Washington, D.C. 20544.
42. See Tobias, supra note 20, at 139.
43. See Bell et al., supra note 5, at 25-28.
44. See id. at 28, 30; Tobias, supra note 20, at 139.
45. Bell et al.,
supra note 5, at 28; Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil ProcedureRevisited. NAT'L L.J..
May 4, 1992, at 1.
46. Bell et al., supra note 5, at 29 n.lll.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A); AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 606.
48. See FED.R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note.
49. See id.
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2), 33(a) (limiting the number of
depositions and interrogatories); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note (noting that Rule
26(b)(2) serves to "keep tighter rein on the extent of discovery").
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There was also a great deal of trepidation expressed at the hearings
that mandatory disclosure would compromise the attorney-client privilege.5 That is, even though no material had been specifically requested,
one would have to disclose something detrimental to his or her client, and
failure to disclose a "smoking gun" would result in drastic sanctions. The
Advisory Committee's response was that any minimally competent lawyer
litigating under the present rules would propound an interrogatory asking
for any relevant information in the same terms as the disclosure rule.52 In
the face of an interrogatory so posed, failure to disclose the smoking gun
would be sanctionable now.53 Over the days and days of hearings, not
one presenter rebutted this proposition.

IV. THE EXPERIMENT
In the face of all of the objections to the proposed changes, I decided

to initiate my own experiment so'I could cast an informed vote on the
changes after the comment period had closed. I put these rules into effect
on my own docket. Frankly, I thought my experiment would prove that
some of the objections were well taken. I expected all kinds of privilege
problems, struggles over the particularity requirement, and a flood of
motions asking for clarification on what had to be disclosed. None of this

happened during the two-year experiment.
Instead, discovery motions on my docket decreased substantially.
What happened is that everyone went to the early meeting, sat down and
said: "Well, what do you really want?... Okay, I'll give it to you," or
"I'll have to write and get it, but you'll have it inside of three weeks."
They then exchanged all of this material. No one debated what "with
particularity" meant. I did not have a single privilege question. The only
"problems" during this time had nothing to do with the changes: a few
attorneys failed to do things on time and confidentiality questions regarding personnel files in discrimination cases had to be resolved.
In retrospect, I believe that the principal factor for the success of my.
disclosure experiment was the early meeting requirement coupled with a
Rule 16 conference by the judge."4 If the lawyers are required to come
together for an early meeting, it sets a positive tone and gets things off to
a good start. With the follow up conference in sight, few attorneys want to

51. See Letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee, to Judge Robert E.
Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee, Attach. B (May 1, 1992), reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra
note 2, at 527.
52. See id.
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(A) ("If a party fails to make a disclosure required by [automatic
disclosure], any other party may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions.").
54. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
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come in and tell the court that they have not done what they were expected to do. So in practice, things run very smoothly.
V.

FINAL THOUGHTS

My experiment with the proposed rules worked well and my court has
experienced no changes with the advent of the disclosure amendments. In
my view, attorneys have abused the system in pursuing the almighty billable hour.55 When I was first admitted to the bar, billable hours were not
as all-consuming as they are now. Practice was more informal, and attorneys would have a meeting and ask each other, "What do you really
want?" It was not necessary to file three hundred interrogatories. Depositions ran a couple of hours and trials lasted a couple of days. If this is an
accuate perception, the disclosure rules are a small step toward correcting
modern abuses.
The amended discovery rule permits the parties to opt out of the disclosure process.56 A court as a whole or a judge in a particular case may
also opt out.57 The purpose of the opt out provision was to allow the districts to implement their CJRA plans." However, according to a recent
survey, only thirty-eight districts as of April 1994 had the disclosure rules
in effect across the board.59 Some districts had these rules in effect only
when the court ordered them applicable to a particular case.' Other districts had some alternative form of disclosure in effect from their CJRA
plans.6 Approximately twenty districts have opted out without any disclosure requirements.6 - All of this has led to an unfortunate situation in
which federal practice, at least regarding disclosure, has become fragmented.63 No longer is there nationwide uniformity in federal practice.
The organized bar is complaining bitterly about this inconsistency. '
It seems to me, however, that it must shoulder a good deal of the blame

55. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
56. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. John F. Rooney, Discovery Rule Lacks Uniformi., Is 'Source of Confusion': Critics, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 23, 1994, at 18.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the bar's efforts to get districts
to opt out).

63. Rooney, supra note 59, at 18. At least one member of the judiciary has expressed concern
over the "balkanization" in the discovery reform process. See id. (quoting Judge Patrick E.
Higginbotham).
64. See id. at 30. But see id. (" 'I think [automatic disclosure has] worked better than anybody
thought it would.' ") (quoting Russell K. Scott, Dunham, Boman & Leskera).
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because it induced the individual districts to opt out." If the national bar
gave the disclosure rule a try, and then used the rules process to amend or
repeal disclosure if it did not work, at least the practice would be uniform.
Automatic disclosure is not an important enough issue over which to
go to war.' It does, in my view, expedite cases but it is not a panacea. It
has problems, but they are not severe enough to short circuit the system.
My suggestion to the bar would be to do as it did with Rule 11; let the
disclosure rule work for awhile. If the liabilities outweigh the benefits,
disclosure can be amended as Rule 11 was amended. 7
If the disclosure system does need to be amended, there are alternative
approaches that would keep the greatest asset of the rule-the early meeting-but would alleviate whatever problems might develop. For instance,
one early version of this rule that the Advisory Committee considered
required a party to disclose only matters it wanted to use in its evidence at
trial, leaving adverse materials to the discovery phase, thus alleviating potential privilege problems.68
It was never anticipated that individual districts would opt out of
disclosure en masse, but only to such extent as would accommodate a
district's CJRA Plan.69 I do not think mass opt-outs would have occurred
except under pressure from the bar. I submit this pressure was ill advised,
and should be withdrawn.

65. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
66. See supra part I.
67. AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 577-83.
68. See Letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee, to Judge Robert E.
Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee, Attach. B (May 1. 1992), reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra
note 2, at 527.
69. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note.
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